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In the introduction to his previous book on the administration of
justice in modern states, Professor Dama~ka described his approach
as one of looking at things from the outside, a peregrine from another
world.' The great advantage of this approach is that it enables broad
characteristics and patterns to emerge which had previously been
obscured by a narrower and more parochial vision. As Dama~ka
himself has put it, "an insider's eye, englobed by what it observes,
must lack the proper point of reference."' This time the peregrine
has directed his gaze in a more focused direction at the common law
rules of evidence, but his approach, as ever, is to shed light by making
reference to very different traditions, notably those of continental
European evidence law.
I. The Three Institutional Pillars
The result is a masterly explanation of what have been described
as those "slapdash, disjointed and inconsequent body of rules" which
have come to make up the common law of evidence.3 In the current
skeptical tide it has been fashionable amongst certain evidence
scholars to cast the rules of evidence as an unfortunate aberration
from a truly rationalist system of free proof.4 The complex, technical
rules of evidence are seen as vain attempts to screen out certain types
of evidence from the tribunal of fact and to structure the tribunal's
analysis of evidence. What Dama~ka does is to provide a very
plausible justification for these rules within the institutional
environment of Anglo-American adjudication. Traditional analysis
has focused on two competing theories to explain the common law
rules, the lay nature of the tribunal of fact and the prominent role the
* Dean and Director, School of Law, Queen's University Belfast.
1. MIRJAN R. DAMA9KA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A
COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS 14-15 (1986).
2. MIRIAN R. DAMAgKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRiFt 4 (1997).
3. C.P. HARVEY, THE ADVOCATE'S DEVIL 79 (1958).
4. For the influence of the so-called rationalist tradition of free proof on evidence
scholarship, see WILLIAM L. TWINING, RETHINKING EVIDENCE: EXPLORATORY ESSAYS
32-91 (1990).
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parties play in common law procedure.5 But through a wider lens and
from a comparative vantage point, Damagka suggests that there are
in fact three institutional pillars supporting common law evidentiary
arrangements. What he singles out is not so much the lay character
of the tribunal as the bifurcated organization of the trial court and
the temporal concentration of proceedings on the trial as well as the
prominent role of the parties in legal proceedings.
If these are the pillars which have supported the common law
evidentiary edifice, then it must follow that their erosion will lead to
a crumbling in the edifice. Accordingly, Damagka develops a further
theme of how, over the course of this century, each of the three
pillars has shown evident signs of crumbling with the result that the
entire evidentiary edifice of the common law has come under threat.
So long as the functions of the court were divided between judges and
juries, it made sense for judges to screen off certain kinds of
unreliable evidence from the jury, but with the decline of the jury and
the increased shift towards unitary courts, it becomes almost
impossible to do this. Again, when proceedings are concentrated
around a single trial, there is a need to limit the database of evidence
and to impose some quality control on the evidence presented. As
proceedings become more episodic, however, as on the continent, the
sources of information can be checked at a number of procedural
stages before trial and there is consequently less need for such
rigorous controls at trial. Finally, a system in which procedural
action is controlled by the parties justifies the need to be particularly
skeptical about the information that is presented to the court and the
need to impose rigorous testing devices and foundational
requirements. Conversely, as the adversary spirit is dissipated by
increasing judicial activism in trials, there is greater pressure on the
parties to agree on evidence and rely less on the exclusionary rules of
evidence.
There is little doubt that throughout this century the cost and
complexity of modern litigation have increasingly brought into
question the need for fully blown, concentrated trials dominated by
the parties, presided over by judges, and decided by juries. Further,
as attention has focused away from the trial and toward the pre-trial
process, with greater emphasis on managerial judging, there has also
been an increasing questioning of the need for the common law rules
of evidence. But there remains something of a paradox in that,
despite some relaxation of evidentiary restraints, many of the rules of
5. Compare JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE
AT THE COMMON LAW 47, 266, 509 (1898) (expounding the jury theory) and E. M.
Morgan, The Jury and the Exclusionary Rules of Evidence, 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 247 (1937)
(expounding the adversarial party theory).
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evidence have shown quite a remarkable capacity for endurance,
particularly in criminal cases. Sir Rupert Cross, who was once
reported to have said that he lived for the day when his subject would
be abolished,6 might be astonished now to know that the latest
edition of his famous textbook is almost a third longer than the
edition he last edited.' In many common law countries, indeed, there
has, if anything, been a burgeoning of interest in criminal evidence,
with a plethora of texts devoted specifically to the subject.8
U. The Endurance of the Rules
A cynic might say that the explanation for this lies simply in the
ability of academic lawyers to generate work for themselves. But it
would seem to lie more in the process of law reform in the common
law world. The common law system of evidence is a "grown" order,
not a "made" order, as Ronald Allen has put it, and as such is
susceptible to slow, evolutionary change rather than radical "magic
bullets."9 Rules of evidence that have disappeared, such as, to all
intents and purposes, the best evidence rule, or more recently the
ultimate issue rule, have rarely gone quickly. In an analogy invoked
by William Twining, rather like Lewis Carroll's Cheshire Cat, they
have appeared and disappeared over a considerable period of time
before gradually fading away altogether." What we are witnessing,
therefore, is a gradual demise, helped along by statutory law, which
in certain cases has spawned as much new case law as it has left
behind."
Another feature of the process of evidence reform is that it has
too often been governed by lawyers' instincts rather than by hard
social science evidence, with the result that anecdote and tradition
have taken the place of cold analysis. One example lies in the way in
which the rules of evidence have outlasted the decline in the jury.
6. TWINING, supra note 4, at 1.
7. Compare CROSS ON EVIDENCE (5th ed. 1979) (667 pages) and CROSS AND
TAPPER ON EVIDENCE (8th ed. 1995) (845 pages).
8. See, e.g., A.A.S. ZUCKERMAN, THE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE
(1989); RICHARD MAY, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1995); JOHN SMITH, CRIMINAL
EVIDENCE (1995).
9. Ronald J. Allen, The Simpson Affair, Reform of the Criminal Justice Process, and
Magic Bullets, 67 U. COLO. L. REv. 989, 991, 994 (1996).
10. TWINING, supra note 4, at 197.
11. One example has been in the area of hearsay reform. Attempts to reform the
hearsay rule in criminal cases have led to a number of statutory changes in England and
Wales. The latest attempt which is under further review is to be found in sections 23-26 of
the Criminal Justice Act 1988. For the most recent commentary on these provisions, see
MURPHY ON EVIDENCE 289-303 (6th ed. 1997). Further changes are now proposed by
the Law Commission. See THE LAW COMMISSION, LAW COM. NO. 245: EVIDENCE IN
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS: HEARSAY AND RELATED TOPICS 194-204 (1997).
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Kenneth Culp Davis pointed out years ago how the legal profession
had become fixated with an evidence law which was dominated by
the needs of the 3 percent of trials rather by than the remaining 97
percent. 2 In our study of Diplock trials in Northern Ireland, Sean
Doran and I mapped in some detail how the absence of the jury quite
dramatically changes the context in which the rules operate. 3 Yet
little concession is made for this fact in law reform. Discussion still
gravitates around the jury trial and lawyers still cling to rules and
doctrines which are in practice proving increasingly irrelevant in the
absence of the jury.
Time lag can therefore explain the endurance of the rules, but
another question is whether the erosion in the institutional pillars of
support has been as persistent as Professor Dama~ka suggests.
Damagka himself points to certain countervailing tendencies. 4 The
discovery laws in the United States have expanded rather than
contracted the volume of material assembled for trial, with the result
that trials must continue to have strong mechanisms for evidentiary
control; 5 and the sheer volume of litigation can also heighten rather
than diminish party control through settlements and plea bargaining
before trial. 6 One tendency which is not explored at any length is the
continuing and expanding importance given to constitutional
protection. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
section 11(f) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
section 25 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, and section 80 of
the Australian Commonwealth Constitution act as brakes on any
demise of the jury. The confrontation right in the U.S. Sixth
Amendment and the right of cross-examination under Article 6(3)(d)
of the European Convention of Human Rights, guaranteeing
everyone charged with a criminal offense the right to examine or
have examined witnesses against him or her, act as brakes on the
diminution of party control, particularly in criminal cases. Even
before the British Government's announcement that the European
Convention on Human Rights would be incorporated into U.K. law, 7
the English Law Commission proceeded on the principle that any
particular measure of reform it proposes should conform with the
Convention; in its recent review of the hearsay rule in criminal cases,
12. See Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Rules of Evidence for Nonjury Cases,
50 A.B.A. J. 723, 725 (1964).
13. JOHN D. JACKSON & SEAN DORAN, JUDGE WITHOUT JURY: DIPLOCK TRIALS
IN THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1995).
14. See DAMA KA, supra note 2, at 131-34, 141-42.
15. See id. at 131-34.
16. See id. at 141-42.
17. HOME OFFICE, RIGHTS BROUGHT HOME: THE HUMAN RIGHTS BILL (1997)
(white paper).
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this acted as a brake on any radical free admissibility approach."
What we see here is a strong counter-balance to any tendency
towards diminishing adversariness in criminal cases. Although the
European Court of Human Rights straddles civil and common law
systems and has always refrained from choosing between the two
traditions, it has been increasingly forcing civil law systems to adopt
stronger adversarial elements and serving as a break towards the
tendency in common law systems to dilute their adversarial
tradition. 9 Besides the jurisprudence of the Court and the growing
reliance on constitutional protection, however, there remain strong
elements within common law systems reinforcing adversary party
control, especially in criminal cases. As a result, the rules of evidence
continue to endure, especially in these proceedings. As Dama~ka
pointed out almost twenty-five years ago, the imbalance of power
between prosecution and defense demands that evidentiary barriers
to conviction are erected in order to safeguard the accused.'
m. The Adversary Tradition
If the adversary tradition justifies the continued need for
evidentiary rules, however, this prompts a deeper question: what is
the plausible justification for our adversary practices? The answer,
according to Dama~ka, lies in the Anglo-American image of
adjudication, which aims in both civil and criminal cases at resolving
conflict between the parties, with the consequence that the parties
must be given control over the procedural action and the triers of fact
cast in the role of adjudicating neutrally between the two sides. As
he puts it, "so long as the image of dispute resolution retains its hold
on the Anglo-American legal sensibility, the adversary strand in
evidence law will continue to enjoy powerful support. 7
21
At this point, however, rational justification seems to come to an
end. For it is far from clear why procedures that are driven by the
notion of dispute resolution have to take the particular adversarial
form of lawyer-dominated, concentrated trials. What is clear from
Dama~ka's own account is that when they do take such a form, a
heavy price must be paid in terms of accurate outcomes. Although
Damagka attempts to find arguments that provide a "protective
18. See LAW COMMISSION, supra note 11, at Part V.
19. See Bert Stuart & James Young, The European Convention on Human Rights in
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN EUROPE: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY 57 (Christopher Harding et al. eds., 1995).
20. Mirjan R. Dama~ka, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of
Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 507 (1973).
21. DAMA9KA, supra note 2, at 124.
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scaffolding" for the common law evidentiary arrangements, 2 there
are occasions when his outsider approach succeeds in raising
fundamental questions about the foundations on which they rest.
Unlike Mersault, the "outsider" in Camus's novel,' Damagka never
displays any passion or bitterness towards the conventional practices
he describes. But he does provide some startling images and
metaphors to illustrate how poorly such practices serve as a
foundation for rational fact-finding. One of the most striking of these
metaphors, which recurs throughout the discussion on the adversary
system, is that of a car driving at night illuminating the world by
means of two narrow beams.24 According to Damagka, it is the
artificial and formalized method of supplying information through
partisan search lights which distinguishes Anglo-American
adjudication from the continental procedural tradition and indeed
from other extrajudicial inquiries. The effect of this method is that
the facts of the case remain heavily skewed towards the destination to
which the parties wish to go, with the result that no light is shed on
other information which could help provide a more global picture.
This light can be particularly skewed in criminal cases where one
side is able to emit a much stronger beam than the other. But the
strategy of erecting evidentiary barriers to protect the defense is
fraught with difficulties from a truth-finding point of view. If the
barriers are too high, guilty persons will be acquitted; if too low.
innocent persons will be convicted. The rising concern in a number
of jurisdictions about the outcome of many criminal cases-too many
innocent persons being convicted and too many guilty persons being
acquitted-exposes what a blunt instrument the erection of
evidentiary barriers through the use of rules can be. For there are
bound to be a number of cases in which the application of the rules
will result in the exclusion of probative evidence or, conversely, the
inclusion of unreliable evidence.
IV. Forces of Change
If the common law rules of evidence can do no more than curb in
a very blunt way the excesses of the parties frantically and self-
interestedly working towards a particular result, we are thrown back
to questioning the entire adversary framework in which evidence is
collected and presented. Are we to be forever in thrall to the
adversary tradition? Why indeed, given its truth finding deficiencies,
have we been in thrall to such a tradition for so long? If we were
22. Id. at 3.
23. ALBERT CAMUS, L'ETRANGER (1942).
24. DAMA KA, supra note 2. at 92, 100.
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presented with the task of building structures of litigation around the
notion of dispute resolution, from behind a Rawlsian veil of
ignorance,' would we really adopt a system of fully blown adversary
trials, dominated by lawyers, presided over by judges, and decided by
juries? Here we see the limitations of an analytical and interpretive
approach which seeks to provide a plausible justification for what has
emerged and the strengths of an historical approach which would
seek to provide an account of the social and cultural forces which, for
example, have enabled the legal profession, and in particular the trial
bar, to hold such a monopoly over dispute resolution.'
At the end of his book, Damagka suggests that new scientific
methods of proof will prove increasingly ill-suited to traditional
procedural arrangements and that a wider range of procedural forms
will take their place. But can we be so sure that lawyer-dominated
procedures which have proved so resistant in the past to rational
inquiry should suddenly implode under the pressure of greater use of
scientific information? Lawyers who have an interest in retaining a
system of party control are unlikely to be eased out of the way by
scientists. In her study of the relationship between lawyers and
scientists, Carol Jones has shown how in the past the former have
tended to win out.'
What is missing from Dama~ka's epilogue is any expression of
the tide of public impatience with the traditional methods of dispute
resolution which is sweeping through much of the common law
world. Adjudication may still be regarded primarily as conflict
resolution, but consumer groups, commercial companies, and victims
of crime are losing patience with the traditional lawyer-dominated
adversary trial. Many are attracted to alternative forms of dispute
resolution which are less lawyer dominated. Others are demanding
changes to the formal processes: less cost, less delay, and more
judicial activism, which in time will result in a different evidentiary
framework.28
It is difficult to gauge what effect these demands will have. In
systems that are grown, not made, we cannot expect any
revolutionary change. No imposed solution from the top is ever
likely to work. But what can happen from time to time is that a
25. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (1971).
26. For an account of the way in which professional groups are able to corner a
market and keep other groups out, see ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS:
AN ESSAY ON THE DIVISION OF EXPERT LABOR (1988).
27. CAROL A.G. JONES, EXPERT WITNESSES: SCIENCE, MEDICINE, AND THE
PRACtiCE OF LAW (1994).
28. For an example of some of the radical ideas which are being suggested in
England, see LORD WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: REPORT TO THE LORD CHANCELLOR
ON THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN ENGLAND AND WALES (1996).
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particular event can come to epitomize all that is wrong with a
particular institution with the result that the institution is never seen
in the same light again. Take as an example the remote way in which
the British monarchy was seen to respond to the tragic death of
Princess Diana, the "people's princess." This seemed to characterize
in the people's eyes so much that was wrong with the British
monarchy that the British people will probably never again regard
their monarchy in the same deferential light. The miscarriages of
justice in the cases of the Birmingham Six and the Guildford Four
some years ago in Britain may similarly be seen as a watershed in the
way in which British legal system came to be regarded. Until that
time, the British criminal justice system was believed by many to be
the best in the world. Thereafter, however, an "appalling vista" was
opened up as it became clear that a number of people had been
wrongly convicted.29 Although the changes proposed by the Royal
Commission set up in the wake of these miscarriages did not
represent a radical departure away from adversarialism," they did
seek to curb its excesses and attempts have since been made to
introduce greater judicial activism into the criminal process. It is not
for me to say but it may be that the more recent O.J. Simpson trial
marked a particular turning point in the way the American public
regards its legal system. In all probability, institutions such as the
British monarchy and the British and American legal systems will
survive in a similar form, but the media, together with public opinion,
can increasingly force the pace of change.
The beauty of Damagka's outsider view is that, from his
comparative vantage point, he can see more clearly than most just
how the objectives of common law adjudication have shaped the
procedural environment; this has enabled him to provide a very
powerful explanation for the common law rules of evidence. What
such a viewpoint is less able to do is to recognize the particular social
forces that also drive the way procedures are shaped. We are living
in a time of great procedural change, wandering, as Damagka puts it,
between two legal worlds, beyond the world where litigation is
29. The phrase "appalling vista" was first used by Lord Denning to describe a
situation where the police were guilty of perjury, violence and threats, where confessions
were involuntary and improperly admitted, and where convictions were erroneous:
McIlkenny v. Chief Constable of the West Midlands [1980] 2 W.L.R. 689. Lord Denning
thought such an occurrence was so inconceivable that he struck out a civil action brought
by the Birmingham Six against the police officers who obtained their confessions. See
JOSHUA ROZENBERG, THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE: AN ANATOMY OF THE LAw 382 n.1
(1994). In fact the very "appalling vista" that Lord Denning considered so improbable
was later opened up when the Six won their criminal appeal in 1991. See id. at 312-13.
30. ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, REPORT Cmt. 2263 (1993). For an
exhaustive critique of the Commission's recommendations, see CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN
CRISIS (Mike McConville & Lee Bridges eds., 1994).
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conducted with the traditional adversary concentrated jury trial as
the governing paradigm, but not yet settled into a new paradigm.
From his vantage point, Dama~ka has helped us enormously to see
where we are coming from, but it would take a very different kind of
"insider knowledge" to tell us where we are going.

